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Although trade liberalization is being actively promoted as a key component in development strategies, theoretically, the impact of trade
openness on poverty reduction is ambiguous. On the one hand, a more liberalized trade regime is argued to change relative factor prices in favor of
the more abundant factor. If poverty and relative low income stem from abundance of labor, greater trade openness should lead to higher labor
prices and a decrease in poverty. However, should the re-allocation of factors be hampered, the expected beneﬁts from freer trade may not
materialize. The theoretical ambiguity on the effects of openness regarding the trade-poverty relationship is also apparent in the empirical literature.
To resolve this ambiguity, this paper examines whether the effect of openness on poverty varies with some country characteristics. Using a panel of
African countries over the period 1981-2010 and testing for non-linearities in the trade-poverty relationship, we ﬁnd that trade openness tends to
reduce poverty in countries where ﬁnancial sectors are deep, education levels high and institutions strong.
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While most economists agree that, in the long run, open
economies fair better in aggregate than do closed ones, many
fear that trade could be detrimental to the poor.1 Africa remains
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).African countries have experienced significant improvements
in trade liberalization. It seems that the large gains expected
from opening up to international economic forces have, to date,
been limited in Africa, especially for poor people.
While the traditional trade theory predicts welfare gains
from openness at the country level through specialization,
investment in innovation, productivity improvement, or a better
resource allocation, the theoretical impact of trade on the poor
remains uncertain. Besides, empirical results do not converge
on this point and it seems that developing countries are not
equally able to make use of the opportunities arising out of
increased access to markets in the developed world.
Our contribution to the literature lies in examining how
structural characteristics of countries affect the link between
trade openness and poverty in Africa. Using a panel of
African countries over the period 1981–2010 and testing for
non-linearities in the trade–poverty relationship, this paperhts reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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poverty. Its results uncover interesting complementarities:
trade openness tends to reduce poverty in countries as their
financial sector grows deeper, their education level higher
and their institutions stronger.
Our concern is with poverty, not inequality. Since trade
liberalization tends to increase the opportunities for economic
activity, it can very easily widen income inequality while at the
same time reduce poverty. Consequently, statements about its
effects on inequality cannot be translated directly into statements
about its impact on absolute poverty. There may be sound
positive and normative reasons for interest in inequality, but they
are not the concerns of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the impact of trade on poverty by focusing on the
transmission channels and the conditional variables that can
influence the trade–poverty relationship. Section 3 sets up the
empirical analysis of the non-linear trade–poverty relationship.
Conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2. Trade openness and poverty: discussion of the literature
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002) distinguish two broad strands
of argumentation when discussing the effects of freer trade on
poverty: static and dynamic. In the former case, we examine how
freer trade affects poverty taking resources and technology as
given. In the latter case, we consider growth effects and the
evolution of poverty over time.2
Following the static approach, the Stolper–Samuelson theo-
rem, in its simplest form, suggests that the abundant factor should
see an increase in its real income when a country opens up to
trade. If the abundant factor in developing countries is unskilled
labor, then this framework suggests that the poor (unskilled) in
developing countries have the most to gain from trade. Krueger
(1983) has used this insight to argue that trade reforms in
developing countries should be pro-poor, since these countries
are most likely to have a comparative advantage in producing
goods requiring unskilled labor.
However, for comparative advantage to increase the incomes
of the unskilled, they need to be able to move out of contracting
sectors and into expanding ones. Davis and Mishra (2006), Goh
and Javorcik (2006), Harrison (1996) and Topalova (2006)
suggest that labor in the real world may not be as mobile: there
are too many barriers to entry and exit for firms, and too many
barriers to labor mobility for workers.
Focusing on urban Colombia, Attanasio et al. (2004) find for
example that the probability of being unemployed is more
important in traded-good sectors than in non-traded-good sectors.
Trade openness may also increase the size of the informal sector
(Goldberg and Pavenik, 2003). Being more exposed to foreign
competition, firms may be incited to reduce their costs by hiring
temporary workers instead of permanent ones, or even to lay off2 See Winters et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion on the possible various
channels for freer trade to affect poverty.workers, who may in turn obtain informal jobs. Depending on the
wage differences between sectors, this could lead to an increase in
poverty.
In addition, if the poor are mostly completely unskilled, while it
is semi-skilled labor that is on increased demand, poverty will be
unaffected — or possibly, worsened. Trade liberalization may
even be accompanied by skill-biased technical change, which can
mean that skilled labor may benefit relative to unskilled labor
(Winters et al. (2004). Lower prices for capital goods or increased
competition following trade liberalization could encourage firms
to import machines and increase their demand for skilled labor
(Acemoglu, 2003; Behrman et al., 2000; Harrison and Hanson,
1999). Furthermore, many developing countries are rich in natural
resources. Trade would stimulate this sector rather than
labor-intensive ones.
From a dynamic perspective, economic growth is key to
sustained poverty alleviation and trade liberalization is argued
to lead to the needed increases in productivity to sustain
growth. Freer trade provides greater incentives for investment,
the benefits of scale and competition, limitation on rent-seeking
activities favored by trade restrictions and openness to new
ideas and innovations (Krueger and Berg, 2003; Grossman and
Helpman, 1991; Lucas, 1988).
Empirically, cross-county growth regressions have produced
mixed evidence. Using either trade shares or indices of trade
liberalization, Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1997),
Frankel and Romer (1999) Dollar and Kraay (2001) and Lee et
al. (2004) find a positive association between liberalization and
growth. However, noting that trade liberalization often occurs
at the same time as other policy reforms, Rodríguez and Rodrik
(2001) have criticized the literature which associates trade
openness measured by trade shares with more rapid growth.
Considering trade policy measures instead, Harrison (1996),
Edwards (1997), and Irwin and Terviö (2002) find a significant
negative effect of trade on economic growth, while Vamvakidis
(2002) still shows that trade enhances growth.
Examining the effect of trade on poverty more directly,
Krueger (1983) shows in her case studies that developing
countries' manufactured exports were, indeed, labor-intensive,
but that the employment effects of freer trade policies were
generally rather limited. A number of cross-country studies on
poverty, while not dealing with trade explicitly, incorporate
trade openness as a control variable and showed similar results:
at best the benefits of greater trade openness seem to have by
passed the poor.
Looking at developing countries only, Beck et al. (2007) and
Kpodar and Singh (2011) find no effect on the poor. Similarly,
Dollar and Kraay (2001) find a lack of any evidence of an impact
of openness on the income of the poorest quintile in a sample of
advanced and developing economies. By contrast, looking at a
sample of developing countries, Guillaumont-Jeanneney and
Kpodar (2011) find a negative relationship between trade openness
and the income of the poorest quintile. Similarly, Singh and Huang
(2011) focusing on a sample of sub-Saharan African countries
suggest that greater trade openness increases headcount poverty,
widens the poverty gap, and reduces the income of the poorest
quintile.
3 See Dollar and Kraay (2001) or Kpodar and Singh (2011) for example.
7M. Le Goff, R.J. Singh / Journal of African Trade 1 (2014) 5–14This lack of any clear correlation between openness
measures and poverty indicators in aggregate could be because
there is too much heterogeneity in the effects of trade reforms
on the poor. Since poor workers in import-competing sectors
lose from reforms, while poor workers in export-oriented
sectors gain, it could be that in the aggregate these different
effects cancel each other. Similarly, cross-country studies
have tended to favor larger samples and focus on developing
countries at best. While using a broader sample increases the
degrees of freedom, it may also introduce unwanted hetero-
geneity if factors explaining poverty differ between country
groups.
Another possibility suggested by Winters et al. (2004) is that
trade liberalization almost certainly requires combination with
other appropriate policies. The sort of policies envisaged would
be those that encourage investment, allow effective conflict
resolution, and promote human-capital accumulation. Linear
regression models would not capture such complementary
dynamics. A number of recent studies emphasize the impor-
tance of complementary policies in determining the benefits or
costs of trade reforms for developing countries. For example,
Bolaky and Freund (2008) show that trade reforms actually lead
to income losses in highly regulated economies. Excessive
regulations restrict growth because resources are prevented
from moving into the most productive sectors and to the most
efficient firms within sectors. Similarly, Sindzingre (2005)
suggests that institutions could help explain the heterogeneity
in the globalization–poverty relationship. She argues that
domestic political structures and institutions (such as oligarchic
or predatory regimes) may prevent the poor from benefiting from
globalization.
More recently, Haltiwanger (2011) and McMillan and
Verduzco (2011) argue that benefits of trade depend to a large
extent on national institutional settings. Trade entails a
reallocation of resources away from less productive activities
to more productive ones. These authors argue that many
things could go wrong in this process. Transportation or
communication infrastructure might not be sufficiently
developed. Competition policy could be ineffective, not
preventing large firms from abusing their market power.
Financial markets might be too shallow to fund new and
expanding businesses. In such distorted economic environ-
ments, there is little chance that the benefits of greater trade
openness materialize and – in extreme cases – a
“de-coupling” may take place, i.e. cases in which policy
reforms induce downsizing and exit of some firms but do not
lead to the expansion of other firms.
Similarly, reviewing the new wave of research under the
International Collaborative Initiative on Trade and Employ-
ment, Newfarmer and Sztajerowska (2012) conclude that the
benefits of trade are not automatic. Policies need to accompany
greater openness to trade, including measures aimed at
macroeconomic stability and a favorable investment climate,
as well as protection for workers and facilitation of labor
transitions. These policies are argued to play an important role
in allowing the potential income and employment gains
associated with trade to materialize.Finally, Agénor (2004) examines whether the effect of
globalization on poverty depends on the liberalization degree.
Introducing a square term of globalization index in his base model,
he finds that under a certain level globalization is detrimental for
the poor and that beyond this threshold, globalization appears to
reduce poverty (illustrating an inverted U-shaped relationship
between globalization and poverty). One explanation suggested
by Agénor (2004) is that at the first stage, globalization generates
a decrease in the output of import-competing sectors, while at
the next stage, output increases thanks to the development of
the exportable sector induced by greater globalization. Using
endogenous threshold regression techniques to investigate the
trade–poverty relationship in China, Liang (2006) reaches
similar results: globalization promotes poverty-reduction in
Chinese provinces only after the economy has reached a certain
level of globalization.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Sample
Our empirical objective is to examine how the poverty reduction
effect of openness may depend on a variety of country
characteristics. For this purpose, we work with pooled
cross-country and time-series data for 30 African countries
averaged over five-year periods from 1981 to 2010. Summary
statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables used in our
estimation exercises are provided in Appendix 1 (country list in
Appendix 2). Following the same approach as Chang et al.
(2009), we start with a linear regression specification and then
extend it to test heterogeneity in the poverty–trade relation
according to some country characteristics.
The article focuses on the three dimensions (finance, education,
and governance) that should characterize an economy's ability to
reallocate resources away from the less productive sectors to the
more productive ones and, hence, take advantage of the
opportunities offered by greater trade openness. A more
developed financial sector, as measured by the private sector
credit-to-GDP ratio, would allow a faster identification of new
and promising sectors and a redirection of credit. A more
educated population, as measured by primary completion rates,
would be more able to acquire the new skills sought by growing
sectors and adjust more rapidly to the new conditions of the labor
market. Finally, better governance, as measured by the quality of
bureaucracy, would reduce transaction costs of trade.
3.2. Model and definition of variables
3.2.1. Model
We estimate a classical poverty model, as follows3:
Povertyi;t ¼ β1TOi;t þ β2X i;t þ φt þ μi þ εi;t ð1Þ
where the subscripts i and t represent country and time period,
respectively, Poverty is the log of a poverty indicator, X is the
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corresponds to time effects,μi denotes unobserved country-specific
effects, and εi,t the error term.
Following Chang et al. (2009), we then introduce interacting
terms to allow the poverty–openness relationship to vary with
some country characteristics (financial depth, education, and
governance). Now, the regression equation is the following:
Povertyi;t ¼ β1TOi;t þ β2X i;t þ β3TOi;t  xi;t þ φt þ μi
þ εi;t ð2Þ
where xi,t corresponds alternatively to the level of financial
depth, education, and governance in the country i at time t.3.2.2. Variables
3.2.2.1. Poverty. There are many definitions and measures
of poverty but the most popular indicator is the poverty
headcount index which measures the percentage of the
population living with consumption or income per person
below a certain poverty line. It is a measure of absolute poverty.
Another popular measure is the poverty gap, which measures
the mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the
poverty line. As dependent variable, we use the poverty
headcount and the poverty gap considering the $1.25 poverty
line.
3.2.2.2. Trade openness. Two main categories of trade
openness measures can be found in the economic literature.
Spilimbergo et al. (1999) distinguish for instance between
incidence-based measures of openness, based on tariff data and
trade policy, and outcome-based measures of openness, based on
trade data. Calderón et al. (2005) make a similar distinction
between policy or legal measures and outcome or de facto
measures of openness. In this paper we focus on the impact of
actual globalization on poverty, that is why we have chosen as
our independent variable (Trade openness) a measure of effective
trade openness (the sum of exports and imports as a share of
GDP), and not a measure of liberalization policies.43.2.2.3. Control variables. We also include a set of control
variables that are commonly used in poverty equations: overall
income per capita (GDP per capita) to control for economic
development, a measure of human capital level (Education); a
variable of financial deepening (Private credit/GDP); growth
of the consumer price index (Inflation) to control for the
macroeconomic instability; and an indicator of institutional
quality (Bureaucracy quality) drawn from the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database which measures the
strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the popular
observance of the law. Data sources are provided in Appendix 3.4 Moreover, as argued by Chang et al. (2009), policy measures are difﬁcult to
aggregate in a single indicator and do not say anything about the degree of their
enforcement.3.3. Methodology
To control for country-specific effects and the possible
endogeneity of control variables with poverty, we estimate the
coefficients of our model by using the System Generalized
Method-of-Moment (GMM) estimator developed by Blundell
and Bond (1998).
To verify the consistency of the GMM estimator, we have
to make sure that lagged values of the explanatory variables
are valid instruments in the poverty regression. We examine
this issue by considering the Hansen test of over-identifying
restrictions. The no rejection of the null hypothesis implies that
instrumental variables are not correlated with the residual and
are satisfying the orthogonality conditions required. A serial
correlation test is also carried out and demonstrates that the
errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation.3.4. Results
As in Chang et al. (2009), we first take a look at the plots in
Appendix 4 which compare the trade–poverty relationship in
the top country group and the bottom country group in terms of
financial development, education and governance.5 The
observation of these plots suggests that the effect of trade
openness on poverty would depend on a variety of country
characteristics. Indeed, for each conditional variable consid-
ered, the slope for the relationship between trade openness and
poverty is negative and steeper in the top group than in the
bottom group.
To control for other poverty determinants and endogeneity
issues, we now test our model through an econometric analysis.
Results of the basic regression with no interaction term (Eq. (1))
are presented in Table 1 (for the poverty headcount) and Table 2
(for the poverty gap), columns 1. The log transformation of all the
variables allows us to interpret the coefficients as elasticities. A
positive sign of coefficients indicates an increase in the poverty
headcount (corresponding to a rise in the number of poor people),
or an increase in the poverty gap (suggesting a worsening in the
situation of the poor).
Overall, our results are consistent with the empirical literature.
The negative and significant coefficient of income per capita
reveals that all other things being equal, more developed
countries have lower levels of poverty. Inflation, financial
development, education and governance variables have no
significant impact on poverty. Looking at trade openness, the
results are in line with Beck et al. (2007) and Kpodar and Singh
(2011): they suggest that greater trade openness is not significantly
associated with either lower or higher levels of poverty.
While the first regression only considers linear effects, we
examine next the influence of some structural country
characteristics in the trade-poverty relationship. The results5 Countries are classiﬁed in the top (bottom) group if they belong to the top
one-fourth (bottom three-fourths) of a rank distribution given by each
conditional variable (ﬁnancial development, education level and quality of
institutions).
Table 1
Trade openness and poverty incidence in Africa-GMM system.
Poverty headcount (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade openness (log) 0.727 (1.38) 5.018 ** (2.33) 12.539 ** (2.02) 2.270 ** (2.07)
GDP per capita (log) −0.707 *** (−4.16) −0.861 *** (-3.89) −0.679 *** (−3.07) −0.539 ** (−2.48)
Inflation (log) 0.106 (1.27) 0.153 (1.01) 0.023 (0.14) 0.155 (1.46)
Education (log) −0.228 (−0.68) 0.432 (0.75) 12.015 * (1.90) −0.629 (−1.59)
Bureaucracy quality −0.091 (−1.20) −0.346 * (−1.65) −0.167 (−1.24) 5.333 * (1.77)
Private credit/GDP (log) −0.222 (−1.09) 8.51 * (1.90) −0.246 (−1.36) −0.305 ** (−2.18)
Private credit/GDP ⁎ trade openness −2.156 * (−1.94)
Education ⁎ trade openness −3.13 ** (−1.97)
Bureaucracy quality ⁎ trade openness −1.298 * (−1.78)
Constant 6.73 *** (3.50) −11.65 (−1.18) −38.844 (−1.61) 0.805 (0.18)
Observations 64 64 64 64
Number of countries 30 30 30 30
Sargan/Hansen test 0.11 0.87 0.88 0.85
AR(2) 0.35 0.22 0.59 0.29
Notes: data are averaged over five years. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Tables 1 and 2. As Chang et al. (2009), our findings provide
evidence of reform complementarity: the coefficient on the trade
openness proxy suggests that greater trade is associated with higher
levels of poverty, but the coefficients on the interaction terms
indicate that this adverse relation could be reversed if financial
development grows, education level increases, or governance
improves.
We first test whether the trade–poverty relationship would
change with the development of the financial sector. The
coefficient on the interaction term with the financial depth
(measured by the private sector credit-to-GDP ratio) is negative
and significant. These results suggest that a greater openness of
African economies to trade is associated with lower levels of
poverty when the financial system is more developed. In other
words, easier access to cheaper credit may allow the poor to
benefit more from trade openness. A threshold of 10.2% of
GDP is estimated for the development of domestic private credit
beyond which the poor can benefit from trade openness, which
is far below the average of our sample (21.2% of GDP). To
illustrate, Ghana, Malawi and Uganda are under this threshold
while South Africa, Algeria and Tunisia are well above it.6
Column 3 of Table 1 shows the results of the estimations
testing the role of human capital in the trade–poverty relation-
ship. The beneficial impact of an increase in trade openness on
poverty reduction is larger when the investment in human capital
is stronger. We find that when the share of the population over
age 15 with completed primary education exceeds 55% (the
average in the sample is 55%), trade openness starts being
favorable to the poor. In other words, with appropriate learning
skills, people are better able to take advantage of the new
opportunities offered by trade.6 See Appendix 6.Finally, we examine whether the relationship between the
openness to trade and poverty may hinge on a country's
institutional environment. Results suggest that the negative
association between trade openness and poverty could diminish
and even reverse when the quality of bureaucracy improves
(Column 4, Table 1). We find that trade openness could be
favorable to the poor when institution quality (measured by the
Bureaucracy quality variable) reaches 1.75 (the average of our
sample is 1.4). In other words, an environment where
bureaucracy is of high quality seems to be more favorable for
the emergence of new enterprises and the closing of older ones,
allowing the economy the needed flexibility to adjust.
3.4.1. Robustness tests
We conducted several robustness tests:• First, we use an alternative measure of absolute poverty,
the poverty gap. Results using the poverty gap confirm the
observations for the poverty headcount ratio (see Table 2);
• We also remove outliers. Results reported in Tables A.1 and
A.2 confirm and reinforce our previous observations.4. Concluding remarks
While trade liberalization is considered as an efficient tool to
enhance development, both theoretically and empirically, its
impact on poverty is ambiguous. At best, the benefits of freer trade
seem to bypass the poor. By focusing on African countries and
taking into account possible non-linearities, this paper attempted
to reach more robust results.
While on average trade does not seem to be associated with
lower poverty, this observation hides important non-linearities
and an interesting pattern of policy complementarities. More
Table 2
Trade openness and poverty gap in Africa-GMM system.
Poverty gap (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade openness (log) 1.122 (1.63) 5.343 ** (2.39) 15.655 ** (1.98) 3.151 ** (2.04)
GDP per capita (log) −0.926 *** (−4.27) −1.085 *** (−3.86) −0.921 *** (−3.04) −0.715 ** (−2.51)
Inflation (log) 0.210 * (1.87) 0.221 (1.17) 0.070 (0.33) 0.250 * (1.74)
Education (log) −0.350 ** (−0.81) 0.527 (0.74) 14.92 * (1.85) −0.788 (−1.55)
Bureaucracy quality −0.156 (−1.39) −0.438 (−1.63) −0.268 (−1.43) 7.010 (1.63)
Private credit/GDP (log) −0.287 (−1.18) 8.822 * (1.79) −0.339 ** (−1.44) −0.407 ** (−2.12)
Private credit/GDP⁎ trade openness −2.261 * (−1.86)
Education⁎ trade openness −3.877 * (−1.90)
Bureaucracy quality⁎ trade openness −1.720 * (−1.66)
Constant 6.028 ** (2.41) −50.19 * (−1.65) −50.19 * (−1.65) −2.036 (−0.33)
Observations 64 64 64 64
Number of countries 30 30 30 30
Sargan/Hansen test 0.12 0.38 0.51 0.26
AR(2) 0.44 0.81 0.73 0.80
Notes: data are averaged over five years. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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sector is deeper, education levels higher, or governance
stronger.
These results are consistent with the recent literature arguing
that the benefits of trade are not automatic and that policies to
accompany trade opening are needed. These policies would aim
at encouraging the financing of new investment, the quality of
institutions and the ability to adjust and learn new skills. This
accompanying policy agenda would allow resources to beVariable Observations Mean
Poverty incidence 64 42.5
Poverty gap 64 17.6
Trade openness 64 65.8
GDP per capita 64 2255.9
Inflation 64 27.4
Education 64 55.0
Bureaucracy quality 64 1.41
Private credit/GDP 64 21.2
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty incidence (1) 1
Poverty gap (2) 0.97 1
Trade openness (3) −0.02 0.03 1
GDP per capita (4) −0.61 −0.55 0.1
Inflation (5) 0.09 0.15 0.2
Education (6) −0.54 −0.49 0.2
Bureaucracy quality (7) −0.47 −0.46 0.1
Private credit/GDP (8) −0.50 −0.47 −0.0
Appendix 1. Summary statistics and correlation matrixreallocated away from less productive activities to more
promising ones.
Trade liberalization should therefore not be seen in isolation
and additional policies will be needed to enhance its impact,
including on poverty. This also means that poor policies and
institutions, weak human capital and limited financial develop-
ment, have not only a direct negative effect countries' welfare,
but also prevent the poor in developing countries from
benefitting from the gains of trade liberalization.Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
26.3 2.0 86.1
13.9 0.4 53.1
28.0 19.1 178.3
2443.3 295.1 13,003.9
130.1 0.3 1042.7
22.4 9.6 93.9
0.89 0 3.17
24.9 0.6 151.6
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
7 1
8 −0.01 1
8 0.58 −0.13 1
0 0.57 0.13 0.47 1
6 0.56 −0.11 0.42 0.16 1
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Angola Liberia
Botswana Madagascar
Burkina Faso Malawi
Cameroon Mali
Congo, Dem. Rep. Morocco
Congo, Rep. Mozambique
Cote d'Ivoire Niger
Egypt Arab Rep. Nigeria
Ethiopia Senegal
Gabon South Africa
Gambia Tanzania
Ghana Togo
Guinea Tunisia
UgandaGuinea-BissauVariables Description Data sources
Poverty incidence The percentage of the population living below the $1.25/day international poverty line World Bank Global Poverty Index
DatabasePoverty gap The average shortfall of the poor with respect to the poverty line, multiplied by the
headcount ratio
Trade openness Sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP International Financial Statistics and World
Development IndicatorsInflation Annual percentage change in consumer prices
GDP per capita Nominal GDP divided by population size
Private credit/GDP Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
Education Primary completion rate: total number of new entrants in the last grade of primary
education, regardless of age, expressed as percentage of the total population of the
theoretical entrance age to the last grade of primary.
UNESCO database
Bureaucracy quality Strength and quality of the bureaucracy. Its values range from 0 to 4,
with a higher figure indicating a better quality of bureaucracy.
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
Appendix 3. Variable definition and sources
Appendix 4. Poverty and trade openness for top and bottom reformers
Trade and poverty depending on education level (Education).
Trade and poverty depending on ﬁnancial development (Private credit). Trade and poverty depending on the quality of institutions (Bureaucracy quality).
12 M. Le Goff, R.J. Singh / Journal of African Trade 1 (2014) 5–14Appendix 5. Robustness checks
(See Tables A.1 and A.2.)Table A.2
Trade openness and poverty Gap in Africa-GMM System excluding outliers.
Poverty gap (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade openness (log) 0.463 (0.52) 5.335 *** (2.70) 19.507 ** (2.32) 2.656 ** (2.12)
GDP per capita (log) −0.920 *** (−3.96) −1.321 *** (−5.50) −1.027 *** (−3.61) −0.802 *** (−3.83)
Inflation (log) 0.135 (1.35) 0.160 (0.94) −0.016 (−0.09) 0.168 * (1.90)
Education (log) 0.158 (0.41) 0.879 (1.40) 19.658 ** (2.35) −0.368 (−1.13)
Bureaucracy quality −0.190 (−1.50) −0.477 ** (−2.38) −0.345 * (−1.97) 6.864 * (1.91)
Private credit/GDP (log) −0.502 * (−1.86) 9.078 ** (2.35) −0.387 * (−1.67) −0.490 *** (−2.69)
Private credit/GDP ⁎ trade openness −2.306 ** (−2.14)
Education ⁎ trade openness −4.956 ** (−2.36)
Bureaucracy quality ⁎ trade openness −1.683 ** (−1.97)
Constant 7.406 *** (2.99) −12.570 (−1.32) −66.094 ** (−2.00) −0.805 (−0.16)
Observations 60 60 60 60
Number of countries 28 28 28 28
Sargan/Hansen test 0.11 0.35 0.94 0.67
AR(2) 0.58 0.21 0.63 0.24
Notes: data are averaged over five years. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table A.1
Trade openness and poverty incidence in Africa-GMM system excluding outliers.
Poverty headcount (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade openness (log) −0.126 (−0.30) 4.239 * (1.93) 14.648 * (2.30) 1.636 * (1.92)
GDP per capita (log) −0.616 *** (−3.72) −1.028 *** (−4.86) −0.761 *** (−3.64) −0.607 *** (−4.20)
Inflation (log) 0.046 (0.65) 0.074 (0.53) −0.034 (−0.27) 0.091 (1.61)
Education (log) 0.155 (0.58) 0.60 (1.07) 14.861 ** (2.31) −0.260 (−1.11)
Bureaucracy quality −0.123 * (−1.69) −0.308 * (−1.70) −0.211 * (−1.68) 4.503 * (1.74)
Private credit/GDP (log) −0.377 * (−1.94) 7.319 * (1.68) −0.276 (−1.63) −0.335 *** (−2.73)
Private credit/GDP ⁎ trade openness −1.841 * (−1.70)
Education ⁎ trade openness −3.750 ** (−2.34)
Bureaucracy quality ⁎ trade openness −1.098 * (−1.79)
Constant 8.733 *** (5.70) −8.316 (−0.85) −47.92 * (−1.90) 2.561 (0.75)
Observations 60 60 60 60
Number of countries 28 28 28 28
Sargan/Hansen test 0.11 0.14 0.99 0.63
AR(2) 0.41 0.25 0.77 0.24
Notes: data are averaged over five years. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Financial development Education level Quality of institutions
Under the threshold Above the threshold Under the threshold Above the threshold Under the threshold Above the threshold
Angola Algeria Angola Algeria Algeria Botswana
Botswana Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Botswana Angola Egypt, Arab Rep.
Congo, Dem. Rep. Cote d’Ivoire Congo, Dem. Rep. Cameroun Burkina Faso Gambia, The
Congo, Rep. Egypt, Arab Rep. Cote d’Ivoire Congo, Rep. Cameroon Ghana
Cameroon Ethiopia Ethiopia Egypt, Arab Rep. Congo, Dem. Rep. Guinea
Gabon Gambia, The Guinea Gabon Congo, Rep. Kenya
Ghana Kenya Guinea-Bissau Gambia, The Cote d’Ivoire Morocco
Guinea Liberia Kenya Ghana Ethiopia South Africa
Guinea Bissau Morocco Liberia Malawi Gabon Tunisia
Madagascar Mozambique Madagascar Morocco Guinea Bissau
Malawi Nigeria Mali South Africa Liberia
Mali Senegal Mozambique Tanzania Madagascar
Niger South Africa Niger Togo Malawi
Uganda Tanzania Nigeria Tunisia Mali
Togo Senegal Mozambique
Tunisia Uganda Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Notes: countries in bold are under the calculated threshold for each of the three characteristics.
Appendix 6. Classification of countries with regard to the thresholds (1981–2010)
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